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The events of 9/11 and subsequent examination of the intelligence community in the 
United States have clearly identified several areas that require immediate repair.  While we 
have, on the federal, state and local levels, a complex system of collecting, developing, and 
analyzing intelligence that can be used to prevent terrorist attacks, we do not have an 
accompanying system that shares intelligence information throughout the law enforcement 
community.   
The purpose of this thesis is to review information sharing between federal, state and 
local law enforcement agencies and to suggest methods to improve that capability.     
In the aftermath of the September 11th attacks, authorities uncovered patterns of 
suspicious activity occurring in places such as Maryland, Florida, and New Jersey. These 
activities included individuals paying cash for plane tickets, taking flight lessons, inquiring 
about crop duster planes, and frequenting drug stores. 
Taken individually, these incidents were not overly suspicious nor were they seen as 
serious when reported to authorities. Yet, all together they illustrate, at best, highly 
suspicious behavior and, at worst, a picture of a master plan of prospective criminal activity. 
When collecting data on terrorist potential, one isolated incident in a local jurisdiction may 
not have obvious significance, but the ability to view all incidents together across cities or 
states might paint a more complete picture. Agencies are now recognizing the benefits of 
data sharing across institutions and jurisdictions.   
The success of the fusion center concept rests in the ability of the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI to make 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Effective terrorism-related prevention, protection, preparedness, response, and 
recovery efforts depend on timely, accurate, and actionable information about who the 
enemies are, where and how they operate, how they are supported, the targets the enemies 
intend to attack, and the method of attack they intend to use. This information should 
serve as a guide for efforts to: 
 
o Rapidly identify immediate and long-term threats 
o Identify persons involved in terrorism-related activities  
o Guide the implementation of information-driven and risk-based 
prevention, response, and consequence management efforts. 
 
Terrorism-related intelligence is derived by collecting, blending, analyzing, and 
evaluating relevant information from a broad array of sources on a continual basis. There 
is no single source for terrorism–related information. It can come through the efforts of 
the intelligence community; Federal, State, tribal, and local law enforcement authorities; 
other government agencies (e.g., transportation, healthcare, general government), and the 
private sector (e.g., transportation, healthcare, financial, Internet/information technology). 
For the most part, terrorism-related information has traditionally been collected 
outside of the United States. Typically, the collection of this type of information was 
viewed as the responsibility of the intelligence community and, therefore, there was little 
to no involvement by most State and local law enforcement entities. The attacks of 
September 11, 2001, however, taught us that those wanting to commit acts of terrorism 
may live in our local communities and be engaged in criminal and/or other suspicious 
activity as they plan attacks on targets within the United States and its territories.  
As a pointed reminder and using Europe as an example, the following is an 
excerpt from Der Speigel, July 12, 2005: 
The scenario on Al-Hindi's hard drive is reminiscent of the July 7 bomb 
attacks on the London Tube and a double-decker bus.  By last Sunday, it 
was still unclear who had detonated the bombs but the attacks, say British 
security experts, bear the handwriting of Islamic terrorists.  Perhaps as 
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frightening as the bombs themselves is the fact that intelligence agents and 
investigators in Great Britain and throughout Europe had no idea an attack 
was imminent -- and this despite the fact that they have spent years trying 
to infiltrate the Islamic extremist network in Europe. Indeed, one month 
before the attacks, Scotland Yard lowered its terrorism alert level for the 
British capital by a notch. 
But al-Qaida in Europe is not an organization that readily lends itself to 
infiltration or wire-tapping. That's because al-Qaida is not a fixed 
structure, but rather an ideology that has managed to fascinate young 
Islamists from Gibraltar to Scandinavia. These young terrorists may know 
each other and even cooperate when it comes to logistics, but they operate 
in small, flexible independent groups, making them almost impossible to 
catch. 
It has long been clear that Europeans, especially Britons, could be attacked 
at any time. The attacks in Istanbul in November 2003 (57 dead) and the 
train bombings in the Madrid suburbs on March 11, 2004 (191 dead) were 
only the beginning. "No country," says EU counterterrorism coordinator 
Gijs de Vries, "can nurture false hopes of being safe."  German Interior 
Minister Otto Schily, who flew to London on Friday to meet with his 
British counterpart, warns that "radical Islamists have also explicitly 
named Germany as an enemy. 
The Old Continent, once a place for Muslim extremists to withdraw and 
recuperate, has turned into a battlefield. Gilles Kepel, a French expert on 
Islam, is already referring to the current situation as a "fight for Europe."1 
Important intelligence that may forewarn of a future attack may be derived from 
information collected by State, tribal, and local government personnel through crime 
control and other routine activities and/or by people living and working in our local 
communities. Successful counterterrorism efforts require that Federal, State, tribal, local, 
and private-sector entities have an effective information sharing and collaboration 
capability to ensure they can seamlessly collect, blend, analyze, disseminate, and use 
information regarding threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences in support of prevention, 




                                                 
1 Andreas Ulrich, "Radical Islam’s Rising War on Europe,” Der Speigel, July 12, 2005, 




The purpose of this project was to identify methods of improving information 
sharing at the federal, state and local level.  What I offer are a set of guidelines that can 
lead to that improvement and facilitate a more rapid, accurate means of sharing data and 
intelligence. 
In preparation for this project, I spoke with or received information from 243 
local Police Chiefs and Sheriffs throughout California.  
While the original purpose of this thesis was to review the local law enforcement 
approaches to homeland security and to examine a leadership model that may offer the 
best method of promoting the requisite coordination and collaboration, I found that more 
basic concerns dominated the local perspective. 
While the leadership discussion was certainly intriguing and worthy of study, I 
found that the essential local concerns dealt with information and intelligence sharing in 
its simplest form.  There was a profound belief amongst law enforcement leaders in 
California that the essential mechanisms for information sharing are poor at best and 
arriving at some consensus on how to fix that problem was far more important that 
examining leadership models and future impacts. 
As I discuss later in this project, there was a gradual refinement of the scope of 
the research from an overall perspective of three over-arching models – Super-Agency, 
Legal and Database approach – to a more realistic, simplified version of a fusion center 
concept. 
I would be remiss, however, if I did not include a small portion of the leadership 
discussion, as I firmly believe that without dynamic law enforcement leadership, we will 
replicate the past mistakes.   
I asked each Chief/Sheriff to respond to the question…What leadership model 
should law enforcement adopt to meet the challenges of homeland security?  They were 
very consistent in their response that transformational leadership would be required. 
(Approximately 94% responded affirmatively).  While I discuss the transactional-
Transformational leadership models later in this thesis, it is also interesting to note that 
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these law enforcement leaders were nearly unanimous in their belief that even though 
transformational leadership is required, very few practiced it. 
1. A Promising Approach 
It is generally accepted that information sharing at the federal, state and local 
level has been deficient.  The myriad of federal investigations has clearly defined the 
scope of that problem.   
A more promising approach to information sharing would build upon what few 
successes law enforcement has had with "vertical" integration - crossing federal, state, 
and local levels of government.  Bodrero2 as well as White3 recommend using the six-
region information network known as RISS (Regional Information Sharing Systems).  
The RISS Network was designed for sharing criminal intelligence, primarily about gang 
crime, hate crime, and cyber-crime, and would provide a model that works and makes 
effective use of existing intelligence analysts who work for police departments.  RISS is 
the closest thing to a nationwide criminal investigation network.   
Another approach is to build on the War on Drugs as an intelligence model, and 
NDIC (National Drug Intelligence Center) holds some promise for development because 
it has always involved excellent cooperation between levels of government.  In addition, 
DEA has identified several High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs), the El Paso 
Intelligence Center (EPIC) being most notable, which represent excellent working 
models of how intelligence analysts, from both law enforcement and the military, can 
come together to work on a common problem. 
In addition, there are numerous states with highly developed criminal intelligence 
units, such as the New Jersey State Intelligence Unit, which has long had an effective 
intelligence gathering and analysis capability.  Most state police intelligence units 
maintain liaisons with INTERPOL (International Criminal Police Organization), 
EUROPOL, FINCEN (Financial Crime Enforcement Network), IALEIA (International 
Association of Law Enforcement Analysts), and LEIU (Law Enforcement Intelligence 
Unit). It makes little sense for the federal government to ignore these resources as they 
represent the "best and brightest" that local law enforcement has to offer. 
                                                 
2 Douglas Bodrero, "Law Enforcement's New Challenge to Investigate, Interdict, and Prevent 
Terrorism." The Police Chief (February, 2002): 41-48. 
3 Jonathan White, Defending the Homeland  (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2004), 27. 
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B. CHAPTER BY CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
 Chapter II begins with a perspective not mentioned very often in law enforcement 
circles, yet was a clear bias of law enforcement leaders with whom I spoke.  Terrorism, 
organized crime, drug trafficking, and arms smuggling are serious challenges confronting 
American policymakers, and law enforcement has an important--sometimes-central--role 
in combating each of these threats.  That being said, there are two fundamental flaws in 
that viewpoint, which leads to a discussion of three basic approaches to the law 
enforcement role…the Super-Agency approach, the legal approach and the database 
approach.   While each has its merit, the database approach tends to support the ultimate 
conclusion of this thesis – a fusion center or some version of that concept. 
 Chapter II concludes with a brief review of existing thought regarding the role of 
leadership in the homeland security/law enforcement arena.  While this is certainly an 
area deserving of further explanation, I do not believe that success is attainable absent the 
adoption of a fundamental shift in the leadership paradigm.  The transformational leader 
is the new model required to accomplish the fundamental aspects of information and 
intelligence sharing. 
 Chapter III examines several existing arrangements that have offered glimmers of 
hope.  There are currently several database approaches that offer promise, yet they 
remain under-utilized and disconnected.  One, the MATRIX system, entered with fanfare 
and exited in ignominy. 
 Chapter IV examines the Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning Group, likely the 
most successful fusion attempt to date.  Driven by the initiative of Lt. John Sullivan, it 
enhances the intelligence and information sharing capabilities of a large, metropolitan 
area and is suited toward the resource driven environment that it demands.  The LA TEW 
again offers a glimmer of hope and provides several areas adaptable to the more diverse, 
smaller agencies that constitute the breadth and depth of the American landscape. 
 Chapter V is a brief recap of the interviews of California Law Enforcement 
Leadership that I conducted.  While somewhat bleak in its prognosis, it does offer hope in  
that most of the leadership in California supports some type of unified approach in 
conjunction with an information sharing mechanism.    
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 Chapter VI offers a compilation of the recommendations proffered by the case 
studies and leadership input garnered from the interviews conducted over the course of 
several months.  My participation in a Homeland Security Advisory Committee was 
extremely helpful in distilling the listed bullets.  It is meant as a guidepost, not a 
mandatory step by step process.  While some areas may be possible for all jurisdictions, 
most must be adapted to individual needs and focus areas. 
 Finally, Chapter VII summarizes the main conclusion of this attempt at 
consensus.  There are other requirements beyond the need to develop a system that is able 
to capture, analyze and pass along the information from the hundreds of thousands of 
local law enforcement and government officials working in communities every day. It is 
also important to have a local mechanism to disseminate the strategic intelligence 
information that is typically developed by the federal government.  
Further, local entities need to be able to collect and disseminate information at the 
tactical intelligence level. If the collection and analysis system is working properly states 
can provide valuable pieces of information to the federal government who is in the 
position to “connect the dots” from a regional or national perspective. Depending on the 
type of information, regions or counties often can take action independently when an 
impending attack is discovered or if plans are discovered that do not have national 
implications.  
 While the term “fusion” center is congruent with the mission of intelligence and 










II. BACKGROUND  
A. IMPORTANCE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND FOREIGN POLICY 
 
Law enforcement leaders are nearly unanimous in their belief that few tools of 
U.S. foreign policy are as vitally important and as consistently overlooked as law 
enforcement on both the federal and local level.  Terrorism, organized crime, drug 
trafficking, and arms smuggling are serious challenges confronting American 
policymakers, and law enforcement has an important--sometimes-central--role in 
combating each of these threats. I believe that role suffers, however, from two serious 
flaws.  
First, differences in bureaucratic culture and viewpoints between the law 
enforcement and national security communities make coordination difficult. Law 
enforcement agencies generally do not see themselves as components of U.S. foreign 
policy. Nor does the traditional foreign policy establishment adequately appreciate the 
distinct culture, capabilities and constraints that characterize U.S. law enforcement 
agencies. Albeit, the New York Police Department has stepped outside the boundaries of 
traditional law enforcement and is forging a new role for a municipal police agency.  
“The NYPD is really cutting edge,” Brian Jenkins, a senior advisor of the RAND 
corporation stated, “They’re developing best practices here that should be embraced 
across the country.  The Feds could learn from them.”4 
Second, there are structural impediments to effective coordination between the 
various law enforcement agencies and the traditional national security apparatus.  While 
many federal law enforcement agencies are beset by turf battles, lack proper civilian 
oversight and are organizationally ill-suited for integration into the wider foreign policy 
community, local law enforcement agencies have not adapted the leadership models 
necessary for success nor properly identified their role in the homeland security system. 
Local Law enforcement has also always been a decentralized phenomenon in 
American society and without a new leadership model and a clearly defined role, it may 
                                                 
4 Brian Jenkins (RAND Corporation), Interview with the National Tactical Officers Association, 
February 2005. 
8 
not be up to the task of collecting, sharing, coordinating, and analyzing the intelligence 
necessary to successfully assess and respond to modern-day threats. 
For most of American history, there has been a bright line between national 
security threats on the one hand and criminal threats on the other. The former were 
international, the latter domestic. The international side was the purview of the military 
and intelligence agencies; the domestic side that of the law enforcement agencies. This 
separation was primarily intended to prevent military encroachments on civilian 
authorities and civil liberties. The fear of militarism in American civil society remains 
deeply embedded in the national consciousness and has long been incorporated into 
American governance. U.S. government actions are still defined by the Posse Comitatus 
Act, passed in 1878 to prohibit the military from performing certain domestic police 
functions.  
In recent decades, this bright line has blurred. Traditional crimes in the United 
States have increasingly been found to have links to criminal networks overseas. 
Narcotics trafficking, most obviously, cannot possibly be combated by domestic law 
enforcement operations alone. A bipartisan consensus also has emerged that the threat 
from foreign narcotics trafficking is not just a law enforcement concern but a matter of 
national security as well. Thus in 1987, President Reagan overruled his Secretary of 
Defense and instructed the military to go abroad to help fight the war on drugs.  
As technology advanced and borders became increasingly porous after the Cold 
War, it became increasingly evident that international crime in all of its various forms 
threatened U.S. national security interests. Sometimes the threats were direct. Terrorists 
groups like Al Qaeda, no longer as dependent on state sponsorship, began targeting 
Americans at home and abroad. They also engaged in a host of criminal activities apart 
from terrorism, from arms trafficking to people smuggling to securities fraud. Vast 
networks of criminals based in Russia, Nigeria, Latin America, East Asia and elsewhere 
went global, infiltrating the United States as one of the world's most lucrative targets. 
Hackers halfway around the world broke into U.S. computer systems, including sensitive 
systems belonging to the military and intelligence agencies.5  
                                                 
5 David W. Brannan, Beyond International Terrorism: Thinking About the ‘Domestic’ vs. 
‘International’ Divide (Oklahoma City: MIPT, 2003), 3-21. 
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In the year 2005, with the international threat demanding collaboration and 
coordination, it is vital that local law enforcement clearly defines its role in the homeland 
security system.  While there may be several different approaches that might be 
successful, the following three have potential. 
 
B. SUPER-AGENCY APPROACH 
 
While the definition of super-agency is open to considerable and varied 
discussion, the basic concept of data sharing and intelligence dissemination is not 
uncommon throughout the world.6  The idea of some sort of super-agency that tracks the 
ideological thoughts of its citizens has been considered in the United States for some 
time.  It is implicit in most proposals to federalize, centralize, or consolidate police 
forces.  It is explicit in most proposals to reorganize the intelligence community, such as 
the 1970 Huston Plan (named after White House staffer Tom Charles Huston) which 
advocated combining the CIA, FBI, NSA, and DIA or the 1996 Webster report that 
concluded the current organization of Federal law enforcement needed to be changed.   
While far from creating a domestic intelligence super-agency (like MI5 in 
Britain), the actual creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was a 
significant transformation of the government approach.  The new department's first 
priority became protection of the nation against further terrorist attacks, followed by 
additional duties for intelligence and threat analysis, guardianship of borders and airports, 
protection of critical infrastructure, and emergency response coordination.  Along with 
the Coast Guard and Secret Service, twenty-two (22) separate agencies were consolidated 
into the DHS, and housed in one of four major directorates: Border and Transportation 
Security, Emergency Preparedness and Response, Science and Technology, and 
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. 
That is not to say success has followed nor did the consideration clearly define the 
current or future role of local law enforcement in the homeland security apparatus.  One 
of the most frequent criticisms of DHS is not that it's too big (America has had similar 
super-agencies such as LEAA, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 
                                                 
6 The English, French and German intelligence are but a few examples of countries that employ this 
concept. 
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established under the 1968 Crime Control and Safe Streets Act and dismantled in 1980 
with NCJRS remaining as a remnant), but that it is too small, and does not include two 
agencies, CIA and FBI, which seem like logical choices for inclusion in DHS due to their 
poor record of information sharing and collaboration.7   
The CIA and FBI are already overwhelmed by a sea of information, and DHS was 
designed to use new and different intelligence to uncover threats.  As the National 
Strategy for Homeland Security makes clear, existing agencies like the CIA and FBI were 
to enhance their analytic capabilities and new agencies, like the DHS, were to build new 
ones.   
DHS was formed without benefit of a strategy to guide its structure and activities. 
Functions were merged for which a clear strategic case had not been made. DHS contains 
many activities that detract from homeland security, including many that have little day-
to-day connection with one another. For example, DHS includes maritime safety and 
drug interdiction, child pornography integration, and research and non-native plant and 
pest eradication efforts, just to name a few. Other functions, such as chemical and 
biological research, environmental measurement, and law enforcement training may be 
linked to homeland security, but just because a variety of functions contribute to 
homeland security does not mean that they necessarily need to be under common 
organizational control. 
DHS does not have viable mechanisms to coordinate with those federal agencies 
not under its jurisdiction. Nor can it rely on other Executive Branch offices that might 
serve that function. Realigning and combining similar agencies in DHS may improve 
some operations after the dust of bureaucratic disruption finally settles, but it will not 
solve the problem of coordination with the other federal agencies, state and local 
governments, and other entities responsible for key homeland security activities. (Such as 
the 28 disparate agencies listed by Dr. Pelfrey described below).  While units from eight 
departments merged into DHS, most of the U.S. government capacity key to the 
homeland security problem is left out.  As noted, the FBI and CIA will remain external to 
the department. Counter-terrorism law enforcement is under Justice. Many bioterrorism 
                                                 
7 The Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (Gilmore Commission Report), (Fifth Annual Report, RAND Corporation, December 15 
13, 2003), http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel/. 
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functions remain at HHS. Defense has major homeland security functions. By the 
Administration’s own count, more than three-quarters of the agencies involved in 
homeland security remain outside the department. It was just this dispersal of homeland 
security-related functions that was the reason for centralizing the coordinating functions 
in the White House under the initial Office of Homeland Security. 
Perhaps, the most important function of DHS was domestic counterterrorism, an 
idea that encompasses the notion of an informed and proactive citizenry (informed via 
new Alertness and Awareness systems) who see something unusual and report it to the 
appropriate authorities.  This is very similar to the voluntary cooperation that police need 
from citizens for crime reporting, or for the success of any community policing effort.  It 
generates the question of how far law enforcement ought to go with investigating 
suspicious, non-criminal activity.8   
Clearly, the purpose of these non-criminal investigations is to identify, halt, and 
where appropriate, prosecute terrorists as well as those who provide them logistic 
support.  It primarily involves a tracking mission for local law enforcement, and only 
secondarily a prosecutorial mission, or bringing terrorists to justice.  It is, in short, what 
Jonathan White calls the "Eyes and Ears" approach to the role of police in intelligence 
gathering.9  It is a system of detecting hostile intent.  It is interesting to note that a 
number of initiatives have been designed to promote individual citizen involvement, such 
as the following: 
• Citizen Corps - volunteers who participate in community-level homeland 
security efforts 
• Volunteers in Police Service (VIP)- civilian police who perform non-
sworn functions of policing 
• Medical Reserve Corps - retired healthcare providers who augment 
disaster responses 
• Operation TIPS (Terrorist Information and Prevention System) -  reporting 
of suspicious activities 
                                                 
8 IACP Criminal Intelligence Sharing Report, August 2002. 
9 White, Defending the Homeland, 40. 
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• Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT) - training programs in 
local communities 
• Neighborhood Watch - incorporation of terrorism prevention into its 
mission via local sheriffs 
• Infragard - private sector and academic partnering for cyberspace security  
 
The most frequent criticism of initiatives like the above (especially Operation 
Tips) is that they smack of police state measures, reminiscent of Nazi Germany, Stalinist 
Russia, or America's own experience with COINTELPRO (“counterintelligence 
program”) of the 1960s that collected files on some 62,000 suspicious Americans.10  How 
to incorporate citizen reporting of suspicious behavior into a system of intelligence and 
law enforcement remains the central dilemma.  Without guidelines, laws, constitutional 
safeguards, and perhaps training of civilians, the citizen role in domestic counterterrorism 
may be doomed to defeat on fears that it promotes domestic spying.  
 
C. LEGAL REFORM APPROACH 
 
The idea of establishing new laws and legal guidelines is also not a new concept 
and has had advocates in the past.  In 1967, a Supreme Court decision (the Katz case) 
condemned warrantless electronic surveillance and the following year, the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act established probable cause as the standard for 
obtaining a wiretap against U.S. citizens.  A 1969 case (the Alderman case) ruled that the 
methods and transcripts of a wiretap should be open in court for public and legal 
scrutiny.  This jeopardized exposure of ongoing intelligence operations, so Attorney 
General Mitchell established the "Mitchell Doctrine," which insisted that the President, 
acting through the Attorney General, had the inherent constitutional power to authorize 
warrantless, secret surveillance in the name of national security or for purposes of pure or 
preventive intelligence.  A number of court cases followed, all along the lines of the 
judiciary warning the executive branch of government to avoid using foreign intelligence 
                                                 
10 Church Committee Final Report, “Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans.” April 23, 
1976, http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/cointelpro/churchfinalreportfindings.htm. 
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techniques in domestic cases.  In 1972, the Court (in the Keith case) disposed of the 
Mitchell doctrine, and in the 1973 acquittal of Daniel Ellsberg, the President was 
determined not to be immune from civil liability for authorizing an illegal wiretap.  
Watergate, which is actually closely connected to the Ellsberg case, but technically refers 
to the 1972-1974 period most remembered for a break-in and bugging of Democratic 
Party headquarters, signaled an end to abuses in the name of national security along with 
claims of executive immunity.11   
In 1974, Congress passed the Privacy Act which forbade any federal agency from 
collecting information about the political and religious beliefs of individuals unless in 
connection with a bona fide criminal investigation, and in 1975, the Freedom of 
Information Act, allowed individual access to any personal information which might be 
secret in the name of national security and applied it to the FBI.  The final separation of 
domestic and foreign intelligence came in 1978 with the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA), which lead to the current amendments in FISA and the Patriot 
Act of 2001, foundations for modern-day legal approaches to domestic security. 
The Patriot Act of 2001 can be seen as another amendment to FISA because under 
the latter, agencies do not need probable cause to gather intelligence if their targets are 
operating as agents of foreign powers.   It is also true that modern (sub-national) terrorists 
do not usually work for a foreign power but for some nebulous cause.12  Specifically, the 
Patriot Act enhances roving surveillance authority and streamlines wiretap authorizations, 
sets up anti-terrorism asset forfeiture procedures, approves detention of suspected 
terrorists, removes obstacles to investigating terrorism, increases the penalties for terrorist 
crimes, removes any statute of limitations, encourages federal involvement in domestic 
preparedness exercises, and supports activities by the Department of Homeland Security.  
More significantly, Title I (Intelligence Gathering) of the Patriot Act permits disclosure 
of foreign intelligence information to any domestic or law enforcement intelligence 
operation.  It permits foreign intelligence techniques, which are generally more 
aggressive, to be used for criminal justice purposes and it maintains the secrecy of the 
intelligence apparatus (compared to the Mitchell Doctrine). 
                                                 
11 Pentagon Papers, New York Times, 1971, http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/history/A0838198.html. 
12 Brannan, op. cit. and Bruce Hoffman, Combating Terrorism, in Search of a National Strategy, 
House Committee on Government Reform, March 2001. 
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The Patriot Act replaces probable cause with a showing of need for an ongoing 
terrorism investigation and goes a step further by placing a gag order on the person 
served with the warrant.13  That person cannot notify the real target of the investigation, 
or in any way disclose what information law enforcement was seeking.  It amends the 
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, and forces school officials to release 
information and authorizes law enforcement officials to obtain information on use of 
library resources, books, and Internet usage.  Again, school officials are prohibited from 
disclosing what was the object of the law enforcement inquiry.14  
The basic dilemma, as White points out, is a legal one.15  Law enforcement has 
for years been accustomed to working within legal constraints, collecting evidence that 
can be used for prosecution in a criminal court.  There is a natural terminus to a criminal 
investigation.  The intelligence community has been accustomed to working with few 
legal constraints, and there is no natural terminus, or end, to an intelligence investigation.  
Criminal intelligence is governed by constitutional rules of evidence; national security 
intelligence is not.  Going to trial in a terrorism investigation often means exposing the 
intelligence sources for the sake of a criminal conviction.  This irony, as well as other 
twists having to do with military tribunals, has produced some rather strange effects in 
the war on terrorism -- American citizens being detained like prisoners of war and 
foreigners being treated like citizens in criminal courts.  Terrorist groups (according to al 
Qaeda's training manual)16 instruct their captured agents to make a mockery of justice 
systems - to insist they were tortured or mistreated, to learn the names of their captors 
and lie about them, and to use religion at every turn to their advantage.  There are other 
factors that dampen the prospects for successful use of law enforcement for intelligence 
purposes, and White indicates the following: 
• Police do not have the academic credentials or higher order critical 
thinking skills to understand the root causes of terrorism, its complexities, 
                                                 
13 USA PATRIOT Act, Section 501(d) states: “No person shall disclose to any other person (other 
than those persons necessary to produce the tangible things under this section) that the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation has sought or obtained tangible things under this section.  
14 For a discussion of the controversial issues covered here, see James D. Torr (ed.), Homeland 
Security (New York: Thompson Gale, 2004). 
15 White, 43. 
16 Al-Qaeda Training Manual, (http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/trainingmanual.htm), March 2005. 
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or the ability to distinguish between terrorist sympathizers and criminal 
terrorists 
• Police are trained in reasonable suspicion and probable cause to make 
stops, ask questions, detain, infiltrate, and collect information, but 
intelligence work requires neither standard in the ongoing collection of 
vast amounts of non-criminal information 
• Police agencies are fiercely autonomous, competitive, turf-conscious, 
mistrustful, and attuned to local politics with little or no interest in 
thinking outside their jurisdiction and/or partnering with non-police 
agencies seen as outsiders 
• Police agencies are focused on publicity and getting the word out about 
their effectiveness at crime-fighting while intelligence work is focused on 
secrecy and never letting intelligence successes be known 
• Police are taught that criminal justice record keeping should be clear and 
concise, with writing crisp and to the point, while there is no such thing as 
too much excess or irrelevant information for intelligence work 
• Police are not equipped to deal with the kind of massive casualties that 
weapons of mass destruction can cause 
• Police are not prepared to face a terrorist enemy who uses criminal means 
to obtain military objectives.17 
While White may argue that the legal reform approach may be viable on the federal 
level, it would be far more difficult to implement, and understand, on the local level.  
Additionally, there is certainly not agreement at the leadership level of local law 
enforcement that today’s Police Officer lacks the sophistication or intelligence to grasp 
these rather complex strategies.18  While the following database approach may hold more 
promise for coordination and collaboration, there is surely a basis for legal reforms with 
an emphasis on intelligence gathering and dissemination.  
 
 
                                                 
17 White, Defending the Homeland, 78. 
18 Personal interviews conducted with 243 California Police Chiefs and Sheriffs, 2004-2005. 
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D. DATABASE APPROACH 
 
A third approach for law enforcement is the use of computer databases with 
regard to Homeland Security issues.  The National Strategy for Homeland Security 
(2003) calls for connecting computer databases used in federal law enforcement, 
immigration, intelligence, public health surveillance, and emergency management.  
Further, DARPA's plan for Total Information Awareness is to merge some of these 
interconnections into a data mining system of systems involving the private sector, the 
finance/credit system, and the Internet.   
Most of the databases involved would be government owned, where they are not 
so different from one another, and can probably be interconnected.  Some, such as CDC's 
(Centers for Disease Control) epidemiology program, continuously scan disease patterns 
throughout the nation's healthcare system for signs of an outbreak.  Others such as the 
Department of State's TIPOFF system compiles information on suspected terrorists 
collected by consular offices overseas and are already interconnected.  There are large 
databases involved, two of the largest being those from Immigration (fugitive aliens 
alone number in the hundreds of thousands) and the FBI (NCIC, or the National Crime 
Information Center which tracks everything greater than a Class C misdemeanor and is 
already overburdened by the size of graphic files).  To demonstrate the current law 
enforcement approach to database applications, the following is a partial list of 
government databases related to homeland security: 
• AFIS- Fingerprint system to identify citizens 
• CCD - Consolidated Consular Database, records of non-immigrant visa 
entries and exits 
• CLASS - Consular Lookout and Support System; program for running 
background checks for visas 
• CODIS - Combined DNA Index System used for solving crimes 
• IBIS - Interagency Border Inspection System; immigration program used 
at ports of entry 
• IDENT - Fingerprint system to identify aliens 
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• JITF-CT - Joint Intelligence Task Force Combating Terrorism, DIA 
database 
• LEO - Law Enforcement Online; VPN with exclusive interactive 
briefings, alerts, and discussions 
• NAILS - National Automated Immigration Lookout System 
• NCIC - Contains criminal justice arrest records, fugitives, stolen property, 
and missing persons and items 
• NDPIX - National Drug Pointer Index, DEA records of common targets in 
investigations 
• NDSI - National Spatial Data Infrastructure, geo-mapping records with 
meta-data tags 
• NIBIN - National Integrated Ballistics Information Network; unified ATF 
and FBI database, but mostly ATF 
• NLETS - National Law Enforcement Telecommunication System, 
interstate license and registration records 
• NSEERS - National Security Entry-Exit Registration System 
• SEVIS - Student Exchange Visitor Information System, monitors foreign 
students 
• TECS - Treasury Enforcement Communications System, for suspicious 
individuals and businesses 
• TIPOFF - State Department program which searches for known and 
suspected terrorists 
• TIPS - Terrorist Information and Prevention System, for anonymous tips 
 
The problem with government databases is not with the federal government's 
attempt to integrate "watch lists," but at the state and local level.  Some state and 
municipal police departments are as far behind as five years in such basic things as 
updating parking ticket records.  In order to have a valid intelligence picture, a greater 
problem arises when one tries to integrate, or commingle, government databases with 
those in the private sector, such as credit card companies, e-commerce firms, or retailers.   
18 
For example, one would need about 15,000 fields just for merging the header 
(demographic) information across these databases, which would represent about 300,000 
bytes per person.  If you multiply this by 500 million people, the header records alone 
would require approximately 150,000,000,000,000 bytes (136 terabytes) and almost five 
years to stabilize.  Then, there is the key identifier fields (also called crosswalk tables) 
which contain numerical records such as social security numbers or driver's license 
numbers which link the different databases together, and one of these has to be a unique 
identifier (pivot table) to put a workable interface on it.19   
Since terrorists are likely to use fake IDs, a new unique identifier system may 
have to be developed, and this will require about ten years of data input time.  Then, the 
transaction data is brought in, generally producing crashes and errors and generating the 
need for continual validation, duplication, and normalization.  The computer database 
approach may be doable, but it will take years to perfect, huge improvements in 
technology, and something much faster than T1 Internet connections for law 
enforcement.   
Secure intranets (on the .gov domain) and secure videoconferences will most 
likely remain the federal government's main way of information sharing with state and 
local governments, along with renaming the 93 Anti-Terrorist Task Forces (ATTFs) 
throughout the federal court districts into Homeland Security Task Forces (HSTFs).  The 
ATTF/HSTF approach does not simply involve prosecutors, but Joint Terrorist Task 
Forces (JTTFs) (which have a longer history, going back to Chicago in the late 1970s) are 
a different thing.  JTTFs now exist in all 56 FBI field offices where some elite state and 
local police are picked to be temporarily federalized.  Since the powers of arrest are 
equalized, true, joint cooperation exists between the levels of government.  
Aside from the dilemma of coordinating the myriad of databases, the 
collaboration required on the local level with regard to Homeland Security issues is 
enormous.  The sheer dimension of the collaboration effort is overwhelming.  Dr. 
William Pelfrey, in an unpublished Naval Postgraduate School paper, has listed the 
disparate disciplines associated with Homeland Security: 
 
                                                 
19 Government Security News, April 2004, 27. 
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• Law Enforcement 
• Emergency Medical Service 
• Fire 
• Hazmat 
• Emergency Dispatch 
• Health Services 
• Emergency Medical 
• Elected officials 
• Public Health 
• Public Works 
• Business Continuity 
• Conveyances 
• Cybersecurity and IT Infrastructure 
• Educational Institutions 
• Homeland Security 
• Private Security 
• Major Event Security 
• Red Cross 
• Public Information 
• Media Management 
• Private Sector 
• Financial Institutions 
• District Attorney 
• Risk Management 
• Skilled Trades 
• Transportation Services 
• Public/Private Utilities 
• Military20  
                                                 
20 William Pelfrey, Unpublished Paper, 2004. 
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Twenty-eight different disciplines that require coordination and collaboration.  
None of the current law enforcement or regional approaches addresses the coordination 
and collaboration that will be required to effectively address the homeland security issue 
on a local level.  While collaboration may be more effective on a countywide basis, it still 
will require new structures, new agreements and most importantly, new leadership.  




As an evolving reality, homeland security presents unique challenges for leaders: 
the context in which contemporary homeland security leaders operate is relatively new 
and it is rapidly changing and evolving. This requires that leaders be adaptable and 
flexible, acutely aware of the context in which they operate, with continual reevaluation 
in order to make sound decisions.   
Effective leaders must establish direction and purpose, communicate that 
direction and purpose, and maintain the thrust of the group. They need to promote 
innovation and creativity and serve as a resource for invigorating the organizational 
culture. Leaders must also be resilient, maintain a multi-directional vision and focus, and 
develop an understanding of the psychological forces that move people. Only by doing 
these things can they make appropriate decisions about what to do and when to do it in a 
context full of conflicting data and opinions.  
Homeland Security leaders have a critical role to play in developing strategy on 
all levels and promoting interagency collaboration, a critical element in achieving the 
strategy.  
While there have been numerous studies conducted regarding leadership style and 
leadership models, I will review two specific models of leadership since I believe they 
hold the most promise for adaptation to the requirements facing law enforcement in 2005.   
 
1. The Transactional vs. Transformational Leader 
The transactional leader manages resources, tasks, and followers to accomplish a 
specific objective by balancing the concern for task with the concern for people. They are 
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managers who view their organizations as complicated machines and their employees as 
workforce.  Workforces are managed by power and position.  
Transformational leaders also manage resources, tasks, and followers to get a job 
done, but do it in an interactive way that enables others to perform to a higher standard. 
In the words of James MacGregor Burns, they "engage with others in such a way that 
leaders and followers raise one another to higher levels of motivation and morality."21 
Transforming leaders go beyond the boundaries of the current organizational system 
toward new possibilities that are rooted in shared values. By communicating shared 
values and visionary thinking, they partially transcend the structural barriers of 
manager/employee or political leader/citizen. These are charismatic leaders who supply 
vision, organization, and inspiration for their organizations.22 
Numerous leadership studies have attempted to examine charismatic leadership 
categories more closely, focusing on the "transactional" and "transformational" 
approaches. In the early 1970s, Edwin P. Hollander, a professor of psychology at Baruch 
College, employed the term "idiosyncrasy credit" to stand for the freedom that members  
of a group were granted to act idiosyncratically. He showed that a seeming paradox 
existed: Giving followers a measure of autonomy increased their willingness to respond 
to a leader's directions. 23 
Burns crystallized the stress on transformational and transactional styles. His 
massive study “Leadership” has, in fact, become the Rosetta stone of recent leadership 
studies. Drawing on a wide range of historical examples and figures, from William Lloyd 
Garrison to Sir Robert Peel to Franklin Roosevelt, Burns offered an ambitious review on 
the nature of leadership, one that returned to Weber's and Simmel's emphasis on the 
leader-follower nexus. Unquestionably, Burns's most important insight was to draw a 
distinction between transformational and transactional leadership. Where transactional 
leadership is merely a version of management that appeals to the self-interest of 
followers, transformational leadership alters the expectations of followers. With integrity 
                                                 
21 James McGregor Burns, Leadership (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), Chapter 3. 
22 Bernard Bass, Transformational Leadership (New York: Lawrence Erlbaum and Assoc., 1997), 
Chapter 2. 
23 Edwin Hollander, The Balance of Leadership and Followership (University of Maryland, Academy 
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in leadership an essential prerequisite and like Simmel and Weber, Burns contends that 
leaders can elevate their followers to new levels of morality and rectitude: "Moral 
leadership emerges from, and always returns to, the fundamental wants and needs, 
aspirations and values of followers."24  
In an attempt to refine further the understanding of transformational leadership, 
Marshall Sashkin, an adjunct professor at George Washington University, has devised a 
"Visionary Leadership Theory" to take account not only of the practices of leaders but 
also of the effect of their behavior on the culture of an organization. Sashkin argues that 
followers are transformed because they internalize the values of the organization.25 The 
task of the leader is to disseminate the organizations principles and to enunciate the 
values that animate the organization. The ultimate paradox, Sashkin finds, is that the 
effective transformational leader can employ a managerial approach in order to transform 
his followers.  I would argue that this is the essential ingredient required for the 
development of the law enforcement role in homeland security. 
Perhaps the most successful promoter of the transformational model in the 
business world is Warren Bennis, professor of management at the University of Southern 
California. Former Vice President Albert Gore reportedly made Bennis's “On Becoming 
a Leader” (1989) recommended reading for his advisers. Blunt in manner, Bennis decries 
"management education" and calls for the training of leaders. "Leaders conquer the 
context ... while managers surrender to it," he says.26  
Transformational leadership does not derive merely from the attributes of great 
leaders. It is the joint production of a team having multiple leaders. It develops as an 
interactive process between leaders and followers. Its driving force is "intended real 
change" rather than simply the leader's vision. The motivations of leadership are jointly 
developed "mutual purposes" rather than a leader's exhortation calling followers to a 
higher ground.  
In this process, organizational managers become transforming leaders with 
important new systemic responsibilities. They combine the role of process designer with 
that of administrator. They become promoters of an organizational culture that initiates 
                                                 
24 Burns, Leadership, Chapter 3. 
25 Marshall Sashkin, The Visionary Leader (Bristol, CT: New World Press, 1998), Chapter 1. 
26 Warren Bennis, On Becoming a Leader (Reading, MA: Perseus Publishing, 1994), 4. 
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and sustains the transformational leadership process. They instigate and maintain a 
process of group learning and face formidable challenges in trying to reach the level of 
consensual decision-making. 
While these two forms of leadership should be present in the Homeland Security 
effort, there is a great need for transformative leaders. Despite the challenges inherent in 
transformational leadership, local law enforcement can also be implementing it because it 
is ideally suited for dealing with unpredictable and chaotic change. 
In my discussions with the California Law Enforcement officials, every one 
acknowledged the need for a transformational style, yet each acknowledged that they 
rarely used that model. It is somewhat ironic that unless law enforcement leaders adopt 
this style with regard to information sharing and intelligence dissemination, the counter-
terrorism effort will be for naught. 
It is no mystery that different times call for different kinds of leaders. In the 
business world, patient, low-profile managers are sometimes preferable to forceful 
visionaries. The energetic Lee Iacocca functioned best when he was leading Chrysler out 
of financial disarray. A similar rule exists in the world of politics. Winston Churchill was 
ejected from office once he had fulfilled his mission of winning World War II. Leaders, 
of course, are usually incapable of reconciling themselves to the fact that they can leave 
an imprint only when a certain constellation of historical forces is present. After a friend 
commiserated with Churchill and told him his defeat at the polls was a blessing in 
disguise, Churchill muttered, "If it is, the disguise is perfect."  Again, the requirement for 
transformational leadership in the law enforcement arena is reinforced. 
Evidence supporting the transactional -- transformational leadership paradigm has 
been gathered from all continents except Antarctica -- even offshore in the North Sea. 
The transactional -- transformational paradigm views leadership as either a matter of 
contingent reinforcement of followers by a transactional leader or the moving of 
followers beyond their self-interests for the good of the group, organization, or society by 
a transformational leader. The paradigm is sufficiently broad to provide a basis for 




Numerous investigations (field studies, case histories, management games, interviews, 
and laboratory studies) point to the robustness of the effects of transformational and 
charismatic leadership.27   
To date, the study of leadership has successfully identified many important traits 
of leaders and made valuable contributions to our understanding of how leaders and 
followers in organizations interact.  
The homeland security concerns we face in law enforcement in 2005 demand just 
such an approach - transformational leadership and a different form of collaboration and 
cooperation than we have traditionally experienced in the law enforcement field.  The 
question that requires an answer is whether law enforcement has a clearly defined 
approach and if they do, how to best implement it.  While the issue of regionalization 
may answer the “how” question, local law enforcement, using a transformational 
leadership model, must first address their fundamental role and how to accomplish that 
task.   
In summary, I believe that the leadership required must coalesce with the desired 
approach of law enforcement.  There are many reasons to believe that a networked, 
transformational leadership style, coupled with database linkages, may be the best 
method.  While I have merely touched on a new leadership model and the role of law 
enforcement, I would suggest, based upon the view of the Police Chiefs and Sheriffs of 
California, that future study might indicate a regional (county by county) approach may 
offer the best opportunity for implementation. 
If transformational leadership emerges, success and effectiveness will depend to 
some extent on the environment, the organizations involved, the tasks and goals 
delineated, and the distribution of power.   
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has made significant 
strides toward strengthening homeland defense, improving emergency response, and 
reducing community fear. Agencies at the federal, state, and local levels are beginning to 
create positive working relationships with each other and to integrate their strategies for 
responding to the threat of terrorism. They are recognizing not only the importance, but 
also the need for enhanced vertical and horizontal communications.                                                  
  27. Bernard M. Bass, "Does the Transactional -- Transformational Leadership Paradigm Transcend 
Organizational and National Boundaries?" American Psychologist 52, no. 2 (1997): 130.  
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Law enforcement agencies have historically been charged with preserving the 
safety and security of the public. Regrettably, this mission is no longer limited to 
traditional crime—the prevention and deterrence of another terrorist attack on American 
soil have become a crucial part of this mission, leaving law enforcement agencies at 
every level of government responsible for restoring and maintaining a public sense of 
security. 
How can law enforcement fulfill this new obligation successfully? What is the 
key to maximizing the probability of success in thwarting the next terrorist attack? The 
answer lies in the ability to know as much as possible about the threat in order to respond 
accordingly and efficiently. The answer is the use of reliable intelligence. 
Identifying when, where, and how a terrorist attack will happen is tremendously 
difficult at best, but absolutely critical because that knowledge could save hundreds or 
maybe thousands of American lives. The most effective weapon in the war on terrorism 
is intelligence - the detailed analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of information. The 
nucleus of this weapon is information collected and shared by federal, state, and local law 
enforcement agencies. 
Intelligence begins as bits of raw information or data. Information becomes 
intelligence when it is organized, analyzed, and interpreted with a specific focus. Without 
intelligence, agencies may be less than prepared to make the strategic and tactical 
decisions necessary to prevent and respond to critical incidents. This concept applies to 
both criminal and terrorist investigations. 
The primary challenge for local law enforcement is understanding through data 
analysis and then utilizing, through leadership, intelligence in a community policing 
context. Before information becomes intelligence, numerous questions must be answered.  
What information should be collected?  
How will it be analyzed and by whom?  
What information must be shared and what information must be kept 
confidential?  
How can information on individuals be collected without jeopardizing their rights 
as American citizens?  
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These are just some of the issues that must be addressed before good information 
can become useful intelligence. Yet the preceding questions cannot be answered apart 
from an examination of intelligence analysis itself. It is only with a clear comprehension 
of the analytic process that one can fully explore the subsequent collection and sharing 
aspects of the intelligence function. Identifying the central elements of a successful 
intelligence function will enable law enforcement agencies to generate practical solutions 
to the aforementioned challenges, establish rewarding intelligence functions specific to 
their needs, develop protocols for working with the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI), Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other federal agencies and eliminate 









III. EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS 
While discussions of information sharing frequently focus on how technology can 
be used to break down the so-called “stove pipes” that purportedly inhibit collaboration 
among government agencies, it is important to recognize that these initiatives are more 
than simply information technology projects. Instead, they represent a specific 
component of ongoing efforts to improve the management, efficiency, and efficacy of 
government information resources, often associated with electronic government or e-
government. As such, information sharing initiatives are characterized by their 
programmatic elements as well as their technology elements. 
Some of the most common categories or types of information being shared 
through these initiatives include intelligence, homeland security, law enforcement, and 
critical infrastructure information. Information shared and technology used by these 
initiatives can vary widely. However, an overarching purpose of most of these initiatives 
is to facilitate better collaboration and information analysis through the use of improved 
information technology and the development of common information standards.  
Concerns about coordination and duplication of these initiatives have been raised 
since there currently appears to be no centralized inventory of all the information sharing 
initiatives being carried out within and between the federal, state, and/or local levels. 
GAO has reported, however, that efforts to fight terrorism have spurred the growth of the 
number of initiatives at all levels of government since the September 11, 2001, attacks. 
Three existing information sharing initiatives are discussed below to provide general 
examples of how information sharing is sometimes carried out.  They also provide a 
roadmap of sorts, by which federal, state and local agencies may refine and focus their 
intelligence sharing efforts. 
 
A. JOINT REGIONAL INFORMATION EXCHANGE SYSTEM (JRIES) 
AND THE HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION NETWORK 
(HSIN).  
 
In December 2002, JRIES began as a pilot project for the sharing of 
counterterrorism information between local and state law enforcement and the 
28 
Department of Defense (DOD). JRIES was initiated by the Joint Intelligence Task Force - 
Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT), led by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The 
initial participants included the New York Police Department Counterterrorism Bureau 
(NYPD-CTB) and the California Department of Justice Anti-Terrorism Information 
Center (CATIC). After assessment of the pilot phase, JRIES became operational in 
February 2003. The number of participants has also grown to include other 
municipalities, states, and federal agencies.28   
In February 2004, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced the 
launch of its Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) initiative, designed to 
connect all 50 states, five U.S. territories, and 50 major urban areas with the Homeland 
Security Operations Center (HSOC) at the department. To accomplish this goal, DHS 
adopted the JRIES infrastructure, expanding both its capabilities and its community of 
users beyond its original “law enforcement and intelligence counterterrorism mission” 
while leaving the original JRIES system in place.29  In July 2004, DHS announced that it 
achieved connectivity to all 50 states.30  JRIES/HSIN is anticipated to eventually include 
users such as state homeland security advisers, state adjutant generals (National Guard), 
state emergency operations centers, local emergency services (fire, police, and other first 
responders), and possibly private sector actors as well. A significant focus of the 
expanded JRIES/HSIN network will be to prevent terrorist attacks by capitalizing on the 
existing human and information resources at the federal, state, and local levels, and 
enabling the real time collaboration and exchange of information for improved awareness 
and quicker response to threats.31  
Some civil liberties organizations have raised concerns regarding the exchange of 
information by state and local law enforcement agencies with DIA, an intelligence 
agency barred from collecting information domestically. Concerns also have been raised 
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29 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Homeland Security Information Network to Expand 
Collaboration, Connectivity for States and Major Cities,” Press Release, Feb. 24, 2004. 
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about the potential collection information regarding the activities of legitimate political or 
social organizations, such as anti-war groups.32   
JRIES functions as a secure virtual private network (VPN), connecting various 
participant data sources using encrypted communications via the Internet. JRIES relies 
upon commercial, off-the-shelf technology and Web-based software that enables users to 
access database and analysis applications, send secure e-mail, send and receive maps and 
other graphics, and collaborate in real time online.33   
JRIES/HSIN is currently used to exchange so-called sensitive but unclassified 
(SBU) information, although DHS plans to upgrade the security of the network to allow 
for the exchange of security classified information at the “Secret” level by fall 2005.   
In the future, DHS also plans to develop an interface between JRIES and 
RISSNET, a long established nationwide network of criminal databases used by law 
enforcement agencies.34   
On July 20, 2005, Matthew Broderick, director of the Homeland Security 
Operations Center said in testimony to the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on 
Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment, that “The Homeland 
Security Information Network-Secret is an immediate, inexpensive and temporary 
approach to reach state and local homeland security and law enforcement sites that can 
receive secret-level information,  the new network is operating and will continue to do so 
until the DHS secret-level backbone called the Homeland Security Data Network is 
initiated in fiscal 2007.”35 
 
B. REGIONAL INFORMATION SHARING SYSTEM (RISS) PROGRAM.  
 
The RISS Program is an established system of six regional centers that are used to 
“share” intelligence and coordinate efforts against criminal networks that operate in many 
                                                 
32 Justin Rood, “Pentagon Has Access to Local Police Intelligence Through Office in Homeland 
Security Department,” CQ Homeland Security, July 6, 2004. 
33 Brian Robinson, “DHS Unfolds Safety Net,” Federal Computer Week, June 21, 2004. 
34 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, op. cit. 
35 Government Computer News, July 22, 2005. 
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locations across jurisdictional lines.36  The RISS Program was created to combat 
traditional law enforcement targets, such as drug trafficking and violent crime, but has 
been expanded to include other activities, such as terrorism and cyber-crime.   
According to its website, RISS has “member agencies in all 50 states, the District 
of Columbia, U.S. territories, Australia, Canada, and England.”37  The RISS program 
uses a regional approach, so that each center can tailor its resources and focus on the 
specific needs of its area, while still coordinating and sharing information as one body for 
national-scope issues.38  The origins of the RISS Program date to 1974, when the 
Department of Justice awarded its first grant to allow police departments in the southern 
U.S. to share/exchange information with each other via computers.39  This support helped 
create the first of the six regional centers, the Regional Organized Crime Information 
Center (ROCIC). 40  The other regional centers include the Rocky Mountain 
Information Network (RMIN),41 the New England State Police Information Network 
(NESPIN),42 the Mid-States Organized Crime Information Center (MOCIC),43 the 
Western States Information Network (WSIN),44 and the Middle Atlantic-Great Lakes 
Organized Crime Law Enforcement Network (MAGLOCLEN).45 
Membership in each of the centers includes federal, state, and local law 
enforcement agencies, for an estimated total of “nearly 7,000 law enforcement and 
criminal justice agencies representing over 700,000 sworn officers.”46  The RISS 
Program continues to be federally funded through the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) 
at the Department of Justice (DOJ), which also has program management oversight 
                                                 
36 For a detailed description of RISS, see (http://www.iir.com/riss/ and http://www.rissinfo.com/). 
37 Available at (http://www.iir.com/riss/). 
38 See (http://www.rissinfo.com/). 
39 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, “Regional Information Sharing Program,” 
Bureau of Justice Assistance Program Brief (Washington, April 2002). 
40 Includes 14 regional member states.  
41 Includes eight western states. 
42 Includes six New England states. 
43 Includes nine mid-west states. 
44 Includes five western states, including California. 
45 Includes nine Eastern states. 
46 See (http://www.rissinfo.com/overview2.htp). 
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responsibilities. In addition, RISS centers are required to be in compliance with Criminal  
Intelligence Systems Operating Policies regarding the confidentiality of information 
collected and shared.47  Each of the six RISS centers provide its member agencies with a 
range of services, including: 
o Information sharing — primarily through the operation of the RISS secure 
intranet (RISSNET), providing secure databases and investigative tools. 
o Analysis — including the preparation of analytical products, compilation 
and analysis of data, and computer forensics analysis. 
o Equipment loans — inventories of specialized investigative and 
surveillance equipment, including photographic, communications, and 
surveillance equipment, for member agencies to borrow for multi-
jurisdictional investigations. 
o Confidential funds — following federal and center guidelines, money that 
can be used to purchase information, contraband, stolen property, and 
other evidentiary items, as well as to pay investigative expenses for multi-
jurisdictional investigations. 
o Training — meetings and conferences for training on information sharing 
techniques, anti-terrorism training; and training in surveillance techniques, 
equipment use, safety, and analysis techniques. 
o Technical assistance — training and assistance for activities such as 
requesting analytical services, and RISSNET installation and support.48 
 
The centerpiece of the RISS Program information sharing activities is a secure 
intranet, RISSNET, which is capable of sharing electronically what is termed “sensitive 
but unclassified information.” RISSNET participants can either connect a single 
computer to the intranet, or establish a node connection, enabling wider access through 
their agency’s network. RISSNET participants use a virtual private network (VPN) 
connection over the Internet to access the RISSNET gateway firewall, whereupon the 
user’s identity is authenticated and access is granted to the secure intranet. The secure 
                                                 
47 See CFR Part 23; U.S. Department of Justice, op. cit. 
48 See (http://www.rissinfo.com/services.htm). 
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intranet is a dedicated network carried over frame relay circuits (a guaranteed amount of 
bandwidth carried over public telephone lines) connecting the RISS centers to the 
database resources. Security is maintained through the use of encryption, smart cards, and 
other Internet security protocols.49 
This system enables participants to send and receive secure e-mail transmissions 
with other RISSNET participants, as well as use secure Web browser sessions to access 
data. RISSNET also provides access to a number of other resources, including: 
 
o RISS center websites — each of the six RISS centers has a website that 
provides information on its services and resources, and provides access to 
criminal intelligence databases. 
o RISSIntel/RISSNET II — electronically linked collection of web-based 
criminal intelligence databases with information provided by member 
agencies. 
o RISSGang — the RISS National Gang Database, a crime-specific 
database related to gangs and gang members, including both text 
information and images, such as photographs, gang tattoos, and gang 
graffiti. 
o RISSLeads — the RISS Investigative Leads Bulletin Board, a newsgroup 
server where participants can post case-related information for the purpose 
of generating investigative leads and can exchange information with other 
participants. 
o RISSSearch — a search engine that identifies and retrieves data from 
multiple databases and information sources, including restricted 
information sites, sensitive but unclassified sites, and public Internet sites. 
o RISSTraining — electronic resources for anti-terrorism training. 
o RISSLinks — a data visualization tool for analyzing and showing 
associations among the results from multiple databases. 
                                                 
49 U.S. Department of Justice, op. cit.  
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o RISSLive — an online, real-time communications medium to facilitate 
real-time information sharing among participants.50 
 
Another recently developed resource is the RISS Anti-Terrorism Information 
Exchange (ATIX).  Initiated in late 2002, RISS ATIX represents an expansion of the 
efforts to facilitate communication and information sharing among personnel responsible 
for planning and implementing actions to prevent, mitigate, and recover from terrorist 
incidents and disasters. RISS ATIX participants include constituencies that have not 
traditionally participated in RISS. RISS ATIX participants include both government and 
private sector participants, who are divided into ATIX communities, based on their 
functions.51  
According to the RISS ATIX website, some of the ATIX communities include 
“state, county, local, tribal, and federal government; law enforcement; emergency 
management; disaster relief; utilities; and, among others, the chemical, transportation, 
and telecommunication industries.”52  Since becoming operational, RISS ATIX has been 
used to facilitate communications for events such as Hurricane Isabel in September 2003, 
the G8 Summit at Sea Island, Georgia, in June 2004, and both the Republican and 
Democratic national conventions in summer 2004.53 
RISS ATIX utilizes four primary components to facilitate communication and 
information sharing. These include:  
 
o RISS ATIX Web page — news articles, online resources, and contact 
information tailored to the various ATIX communities. 
o RISS ATIX bulletin board — a newsgroup server where participants can 
post information related to terrorism, disasters, and homeland security, as 
well as “page” online participants and send secure e-mail messages. 
                                                 
50 National Narcotic Officers’ Association Coalition, “Regional Information Sharing Program,” 
NNOAC Insight, April 2005, 33. 
51 “The RISS Program”, 2002. 
52 See http://www.rissinfo.com/rissatix.htm, February, 2005. 
53 Michael Lynch, “Facilitating an Enhanced Information Sharing Network that Links Law 
Enforcement and Homeland Security for Federal, State, Local Governments,” Senate hearing statement, 
March 23, 2005. 
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o ATIXLive — an online, real-time communications medium to facilitate 
real-time information sharing among participants, including the “paging” 
function and the ability to send secure e-mail messages from within the 
ATIXLive application. 
o ATIX secure e-mail — a secure e-mail application to send and receive 
homeland security alerts and exchange information with other 
participants.54 
 
On September 1, 2002, RISSNET interconnected with the FBI Law 
Enforcement Online (LEO) system to create a so-called “virtual single system” for the 
purpose of exchanging sensitive but unclassified homeland security information.  Both 
RISSNET and LEO participants can access these resources combined using a single 
logon identifier. Participants can also exchange secure e-mail messages. RISSNET has 
established, or is in the process of establishing, interconnections with other information 
sharing networks as well, including the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications 
System (NLETS), the Criminal Information Sharing Alliance (CISAnet), and the 
subsequently failed, Multi-state Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange (MATRIX) Pilot 
Project.55  As with other information sharing initiatives, civil liberties organizations have 
raised concerns about privacy and the potential misuse of personal data as more 
information sources become interconnected and available to a larger number of users. 
 
C. MULTI-STATE ANTI-TERRORISM INFORMATION EXCHANGE 
(MATRIX) PILOT INFORMATION SHARING PROJECT.  
 
The MATRIX project was initially developed in the days following the 
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks by Seisint, a Floridabased information products 
company, in an effort to facilitate collaborative information sharing and factual data 
analysis. At the outset of the project, MATRIX included a component Seisint called the  
 
 
                                                 
54 See http://www.rissinfo.com/rissatix.htm, March 2005. 
55 “The RISS Program.” 2002.  
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High Terrorist Factor (HTF), which was designed to identify individuals with high HTF 
scores, or so-called terrorism quotients, based on an analysis of demographic and 
behavioral data.  
Although the HTF scoring system appeared to attract the interest of officials, this 
feature was reportedly dropped from MATRIX because it relied on intelligence data not 
normally available to the law enforcement community and because of concerns about 
privacy abuses.56 
In initial form, the MATRIX pilot project was administered through a 
collaborative effort between Seisint, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement 
(FDLE)57, and the Institute for Intergovernmental Research (IIR), a “Florida-based 
nonprofit research and training organization, [that] specializes in law enforcement, 
juvenile justice, and criminal justice issues.”58  FDLE served as the “security agent” for 
MATRIX, administering control over which agencies and individuals had access to the 
system. FDLE was also a participant state in MATRIX. IIR was responsible for 
administrative support, and was the grantee for federal funds received for MATRIX.59 
Before closing, it had been reported that the MATRIX pilot project had received a 
total of $12 million in federal funding — $8 million from the Office for Domestic 
Preparedness (ODP) at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and $4 million, 
from the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) at the Department of Justice (DOJ).60 
The analytical core of the MATRIX pilot project was an application called 
Factual Analysis Criminal Threat Solution (FACTS), described as a “technological, 
investigative tool allowing query-based searches of available state and public records in 
the data reference repository.”61  The FACTS application allowed an authorized user to 
search “dynamically combined records from disparate datasets” based on partial  
                                                 
56 Brian Bergstein, “Database Firm Tagged 120,000 Terrorism “suspects” for Feds,” (Biloxi, MS) 
Sun-Herald, May 20, 2004. 
57 The FDLE website is available at (http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/), March 2005. 
58 The IIR website is available at (http://www.iir.com/), March 2005. 
59 See (http://www.matrix-at.org/roles.htm), March 2005. 
60 John Schwartz, “Privacy Fears Erode Support for a Network to Fight Crime,” New York Times, 
March 15, 2004. 
61 For a more detailed description of FACT, see (http://www.matrix-at.org/FACTS_defined.htm), 
March 2005. 
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information that could “assemble” the results.62  The data reference repository used with 
FACTS represented an amalgamation of over 3.9 billion public records collected from 
thousands of sources.63  
 The data contained in FACTS included FAA pilot license and aircraft ownership 
records, property ownership records, information on vessels registered with the Coast 
Guard, state sexual offender lists, federal terrorist watch lists, corporation filings, 
Uniform Commercial Code filings, bankruptcy filings, state-issued professional license 
records, criminal history information, department of corrections information and photo 
images, driver’s license information and photo images, motor vehicle registration 
information, and information from commercial sources that “were generally available to 
the public or legally permissible under federal law.”64 
The data reference repository was said to exclude data such as telemarketing call 
lists; direct mail mailing lists; airline reservations or travel records, frequent flyer/hotel 
stay program membership information or activity; magazine subscription records; 
information about purchases made at retailers or over the Internet; telephone calling logs 
or records; credit or debit card numbers; mortgage or car payment information; bank 
account numbers or balance information; records of birth certificates, marriage licenses, 
and divorce decrees; and utility bill payment information. Participating law enforcement 
agencies utilized this information sharing and data mining resource over the Regional 
Information Sharing Systems (RISS) secure intranet (RISSNET), described above. 
Some civil liberties organizations raised concerns about law enforcement actions 
being taken based on algorithms and analytical criteria developed by a private 




                                                 
62 For a more detailed description of FACT, see (http://www.matrix-at.org/FACTS_defined.htm), 
March 2005. 
63 See (http://www.matrix-at.org/newsletter.pdf), March 2005. 
64 For more information about data included in and excluded from the data reference repository, see 
(http://www.matrix-at.org/data_sources.htm), March 2005. 
65 William Welsh, “Feds Offer to Mend Matrix,” Washington Technology May 24, 2004. 
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Questions were also raised about the level of involvement of the federal 
government, particularly the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of 
Justice, in a project that was ostensibly focused on supporting state-based information 
sharing.66 
From initiation, the MATRIX pilot project suffered setbacks in recruiting states to 
participate. The lack of participation was especially troubling for a networked 
information sharing project such as MATRIX because, as Metcalfe’s Law suggests, “the 
power of the network increases exponentially by the number of computers connected to 
it.”67   While as many as 16 states had been reported to have either participated or 
seriously considered participating in MATRIX at its outset, several chose to withdraw, 
leaving a current total of five states, including Florida, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
and Connecticut, actively participating. State officials have cited a variety of reasons for 
not participating in MATRIX, including costs, concerns about violating state privacy 
laws, and duplication of existing resources.68 
To help address the privacy concerns associated with a centralized data 
repository, some officials have suggested switching to a distributed approach whereby 
each state would maintain possession of its data and control access according to its 
individual laws.  







                                                 
66 Robert O’Harrow, Jr., “Anti-Terror Database Got Show at White House,” Washington Post, May 
21, 2004. 
67 For a more detailed description of Metcalfe’s Law, see 
(http://searchnetworking.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid7_gci214115,00.html), March 2005. 
68 The states that have decided to withdraw from the project include Alabama, California, Georgia, 




















IV. LOS ANGELES TERRORISM EARLY WARNING GROUP 
The concept is simple.  Representatives of various first-responder agencies in a 
given area agree to meet on a regular basis to share information, analyze potential threats, 
plan for emergency procedures and establish the various chains of command and 
communication in the event of an attack.   
“Because they are looking at threats, they can help direct preparedness,” says 
Brian Houghton, Director of Research for the National Memorial Institute for the 
Prevention of Terrorism, in Oklahoma City.  “Having people looking at what the threats 
are, they can more effectively utilize funding, as opposed to just building a wish list from 
the most vocal departments.”69 
The Los Angeles County Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Group is the paradigm 
for such groups, partly because they have been at it longer than anyone else in the nation 
and they are the largest group, with about two dozen full-time staff members.  The Los 
Angeles TEW was established in 1996 to perform as an interagency information sharing 
and analysis function designed to serve the information needs of local, state, and federal 
agencies involved in all phases of homeland security operations. 
 With an early attempt at transformational leadership and integration of disparate 
databases and agencies, the LA group may be the shining example of the future of law 
enforcement anti-terrorism efforts. While the measurements of success, the number of 
“preventions,” are very difficult to count, the joint effort approach certainly puts 
everyone on the same page.  As the Deputy Commissioner for Intelligence at NYPD, 
David Cohen, said, “I don’t know what we’ve stopped, it’s impossible to calculate, and I 
don’t spend much time thinking about it.  I have to be thinking about the next thing.”70 
                                                 
69 Brian Houghton (Director of Research for the National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of 
Terrorism), interview with Author, March 2005. 
70 David Cohen (New York Police Department Deputy Commissioner), CNN interview, April 2005. 
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 What follows is a brief look at the Los Angeles TEW and the possible model for 
other efforts.  There are approximately 14 similar type groups operating across the 
country.71 
 
A. THE TEW MODEL 
 
The TEW is a multilateral, multi-jurisdictional, and multi-disciplinary effort. It 
integrates law enforcement, fire, health, and emergency management agencies to address 
the intelligence needs for combating terrorism and protecting critical infrastructure. The 
TEW goes beyond criminal intelligence fusion and analysis. It results in “all source/all 
phase” fusion. In other words, it integrates all the information necessary for achieving a 
situational understanding at all phases of operations (before, during, and after an 
incident).  
The TEW in Los Angeles includes a multidisciplinary fusion center staffed by 
“core agencies” including the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, Los Angeles 
Police Department, Los Angeles Division of the FBI, Los Angeles Fire Department, Los 
Angeles County Fire Department, and Los Angeles County Health Department. The 
TEW also receives support from state agencies and independent police, fire, and health 
agencies in Los Angeles County. The core agencies contribute permanent and surge staff, 
forward all potential terrorist criminal leads and pre-incident indicators to the TEW for 
assessment, and participate in joint training and exercises to facilitate TEW operations. In 
addition, each agency (and stations or units at larger agencies) have established Terrorism 
Liaison Officers (TLOs) to enhance two-way information exchange between the TEW 
and cooperating agencies. The TEW works in cooperation with Joint Terrorism Task 
Forces and other investigative agencies to improve prevention and response and to ensure 




                                                 
71 The following cities/counties have established a TEW or similar group: San Diego, Los Angeles 
County, Inland Empire (San Bernardino County), Sacramento, Pierce County Washington, Albuquerque, 
Tulsa, New Orleans, Minneapolis/St. Paul, Cincinnati, Miami, Phoenix, Detroit and Denver. (From an 
informal survey conducted by the National Tactical Officers Association, 2005). 
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B. TEW ORGANIZATION 
 
As depicted in Figure 1, the TEW is organized into six mutually supportive cells. 
The responsibilities of each cell are described below: 
o The Unified Command cell provides direction, sets intelligence 
requirements, and interacts with the incident command entities.   
o The Analysis/Synthesis cell coordinates net assessment activities and 
develops the collection plan. (It requests information be sought by the 
various net assessment elements and develops the results of all the cells’ 
analysis into actionable intelligence products, including advisories, alerts, 
warnings, and mission folders to assist response.) 
o The Consequence Management cell assesses the law enforcement, fire, 
and health consequences of the event.   
o The Investigative Liaison cell coordinates with criminal investigative 
entities and the traditional intelligence community.   
o The Epidemiological Intelligence (Epi-Intel) cell is responsible for real-
time disease surveillance and coordination with the disease investigation.  
o The Forensic Intelligence Support cell exploits a range of technical means 
to support the TEW fusion process. These include chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear explosives (CBRNE) reconnaissance, the use of 















Epi-Intel Forensic Intel Support
 
 
The Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Group model is designed for both “first 
responder” agencies and “follow-on” response agencies, as a cooperative vehicle for 
obtaining and assessing the information and intelligence needed for an effective 
homeland security response. It establishes a high degree of interoperability among levels 
of responders (local, state, federal), disciplines (law enforcement, fire service, public 
health and medical), and civil and military agencies. This model demonstrates that 
intelligence is an important element in forging an interagency response.72 
The Appendix  is a Ventura Police Department Training Bulletin that describes 
another recent effort toward Information and Intelligence sharing initiated by the State of 
California. 
                                                 
72 Sgt. John Sullivan, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, and Commander Mike Grossman, 
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, NPS Presentation, January, 2005.  
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V. CALIFORNIA LAW ENFORCEMENT LEADERSHIP 
PERSPECTIVE 
From 2004 through 2005, I spoke with 243 Police Chiefs and Sheriffs in 
California.  In asking a series of basic questions, I believe their answers are indicative of 
the current state of intelligence and information sharing at the local level.  As a result of 
the information obtained during these interviews, I combined their responses with the 
existing information available to draw several conclusions as to the next steps in this 
information sharing journey that we began on September 11, 2001.   
 Since the role of law enforcement agencies varies according to 
Department size, I have grouped the Departments into the following categories: 
 Group One – Over 500 sworn Officers 
 Group Two – 100-500 Sworn Officers 
 Group Three – 50-100 Sworn Officers 
 Group Four – Less than 50 Sworn Officers 
  
Table 1. Responses to Interview Questions, Group 1 (Over 500) 
N = 12 
Question Yes No 
Is there adequate information/intelligence sharing 
between federal, state and local agencies? 
17% 83% 
Do you have adequate resources to accomplish 
your intelligence collection responsibility since September 
11? 
0% 100%
Has your agency received adequate training in 
intelligence/information sharing requirements? 
75% 25% 
Are you aware of the variety of federal databases 
and information sharing technologies?  
83% 17% 
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Do you receive daily, updated intelligence 
briefings? 
100% 0% 




Table 2. Responses to Interview Questions, Group 2 (100-500) 
N=45 
 
Question Yes No 
Is there adequate information/intelligence sharing 
between federal, state and local agencies? 
22% 78%
Do you have adequate resources to accomplish your 
intelligence collection responsibility since September 11? 
13% 87%
Has your agency received adequate training in 
intelligence/information sharing requirements? 
13% 87%
Are you aware of the variety of federal databases and 
information sharing technologies?  
62% 38%
Do you receive daily, updated intelligence briefings? 31% 69%




Table 3. Responses to Interview Questions, Group 3 (50-100) 
N=74 
 
Question Yes No 
Is there adequate information/intelligence sharing 
between federal, state and local agencies? 
19% 81%
Do you have adequate resources to accomplish your 
intelligence collection responsibility since September 11? 
11% 89%
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Has your agency received adequate training in 
intelligence/information sharing requirements? 
5% 95%
Are you aware of the variety of federal databases and 
information sharing technologies?  
27% 73%
Do you receive daily, updated intelligence briefings? 27% 73%




Table 4. Responses to Interview Questions, Group 4 (<50) 
N=112 
 
Question Yes No 
Is there adequate information/intelligence sharing 
between federal, state and local agencies? 
29% 71%
Do you have adequate resources to accomplish your 
intelligence collection responsibility since September 11? 
12% 88%
Has your agency received adequate training in 
intelligence/information sharing requirements? 
10% 90%
Are you aware of the variety of federal databases and 
information sharing technologies?  
28% 72%
Do you receive daily, updated intelligence briefings? 12% 88%




The survey results are only meant to indicate the current state of law enforcement 
in California with regard to homeland security issues and information sharing.  It is 
reassuring to know that the overwhelming majority of large agencies (over 500 sworn) 
feel that they have received adequate training, are aware of the variety of databases 
available, receive daily intelligence briefings and would (or do) participate in a local 
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fusion center effort.  It is also noteworthy that the main difference in the responses by 
department size is in the area of daily counter-terrorism intelligence briefings.  Only the 
largest agencies seem to have a consistent approach in that regard. 
It is also very clear that, across the board, local law enforcement agencies feel that 
there is inadequate information sharing and resources available to accomplish the 
homeland security mission.  While the term adequate is open to a variety of 
interpretations, the context of the discussion and subsequent question for the Chiefs and 
Sheriffs dealt essentially with timeliness and complete information. 
An excerpt from an article in the New York Times, July 29, 2005 states, “Among 
the leaders is William J. Bratton, the Los Angeles Police Chief, who said in interviews 
Wednesday and Thursday that while the quality of information from the F.B.I. and the 
Department of Homeland Security was generally good, it often arrived far too late to be 
of any immediate value to local police departments.” 
"The frustration is that intelligence gathering and sharing networks at the federal 
level are not working for local chiefs of police," Chief Bratton said. "We're used to things 
breaking very quickly and have to respond quickly. We don't have the luxury of waiting." 
He said the federal agencies and joint terrorism task forces that include local 
officials were chiefly investigative and analytical agencies and were not geared to 
providing real-time intelligence to local police. Local police and sheriffs departments, not 
federal authorities, have to decide quickly how to deploy their troops to respond to an 
immediate threat or an incident like the London subway bombings this month.”73 
The idea of a joint partnership and shared information is voiced repeatedly by 
California law enforcement executives.  It is best summarized by the following 
statements made by the two Chief’s from mid-size California law enforcement agencies: 
 
Local law enforcement is not 100% correct. We all have to meet half way. 
There has to be an assessment of threats and a value judgment. But the 
federal government has to trust local officials to work with INS, DHS, 
FBI, in joint assessments. We’re ignored in our assessment of things. The 
federal government must be more flexible. 
                                                 
73 John Broder, “Police Chiefs Moving to Share Terror Data,” New York Times, July 29, 2005. 
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Real intervention is a partnership that’s horizontal and vertical. We cannot 
have a clear understanding of how terrorists function if we do not take into 
account the local police. We have to bring forth a new concept of 
prevention – we don’t have that curriculum. All tools now rest with the 
federal government, but their knowledge is disassembled. Even the JTTFs 
don’t have the picture. We must socialize the sharing of resources, 
including intelligence. And we should audit police departments. If they 
pay attention to your report, if they ask these questions across the country, 
we’ll be in a much better position to know what’s to be done.74 
 
                                                 
74 Maria Rasmussen, "Perceptions of Homeland Security Needs by Law Enforcement Executives in 
California," unpublished manuscript, CHDS, Monterey, June 05, 28. 
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 I have divided my recommendations into two sections.  The first describes 
four stages of growth for a sample Terrorism Working Group effort.  These were 
developed with the assistance of Lt. John Sullivan of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s 
Department.  The second describes the results of my participation in a Homeland Security 
Advisory Committee.  My working group developed sample recommendations for fusion 
center implementation that are listed below.75  Based upon the interviews conducted with 
the California Police Chiefs and Sheriffs, I have added their comments as appropriate.   
 
Table 5. TEWG Growth Stages 
 
Type 1 
o Integrating concept (clarifying TEWG concept with Stakeholders 
o Monthly Meetings (for training and information sharing) 
o Committees/doctrine/IPO (Intelligence Preparation for Operation) 
Type II 
o Net Assessment for Special Events/specific threats 
o Workshops supplement monthly meetings (topics such as cyber-terrorism 
or suicide bombings) 
Type III 
o Full time staff 
o All-source Intel (open source, sensitive/classified/on-going investigations) 
o Multi-agency joint intel 
o Net Assessment Center 
Type III (with 
Technology 
enabled) 
o GIS, data-mining 
Type IV o Networked with other TEWs (node-to-node collaboration) o Distributed users/producers of intel 
 
 
Effective intelligence/information fusion requires the following: 
 
o The use of common terminology, and definitions by all stakeholders 
 
o Up-to-date awareness and understanding of the global and domestic threat 
environment 
 
o A clear understanding of the links between terrorism-related intelligence 
and Non-terrorism-related information (e.g., flight school training, drug 
trafficking) so as to identify those activities that are precursors or 
indicators of an emerging threat 
 
                                                 
75 Homeland Security Advisory Council, “Intelligence and Information Sharing Initiative: Homeland 
Security Intelligence and Information Fusion,” April, 2005. 
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o Clearly defined intelligence and information requirements with the Federal 
intelligence community that prioritize and guide planning, collection, 
analysis, dissemination, and reevaluation efforts 
 
o Identifying critical information repositories2 and establishing the 
processes, protocols, procedures, and technical capabilities to extract 
information and/or intelligence from those repositories 
 
o Reliance on existing information pathways and analytic processes as 
possible 
 
o All-hazards and all-crimes approach to defining information collection, 
analysis, and dissemination 
 
o Clear delineation of roles, responsibilities, and requirements of each level 
and sector of government involved in the fusion process 
 
o Understanding and elimination of impediments to information collection 
and sharing (i.e., it should be a priority for the Federal Government to 
provide State, local, and tribal entities unclassified terrorism-related 
information/intelligence so that it can be integrated into statewide and/or 
local fusion efforts)  
 
o Capacity to convert information into operational intelligence   
 
o Extensive and continuous interaction with the private sector and with the 
public at large   
 
o Connectivity (technical and/or procedural) with critical intelligence 
streams, analysis centers, communication centers, and information 
repositories at all levels of classification as necessary   
 
o Extensive participation of subject-matter experts (SMEs) in the analytical 
process  
 
o Capacity and commitment to ensure aggressive oversight and 
accountability so as to protect against the infringement of constitutional 
protections and civil liberties. 
 
The fusion process is a key part of our nation’s homeland security efforts. This 
process supports the implementation of risk-based, information-driven prevention, 
response, and consequence management programs. Simultaneously, it supports efforts to 
address immediate and/or emerging, threat-related circumstances and events. Although 
the collection, analysis, and dissemination of terrorism-related intelligence is not the sole 
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goal of the fusion process, one of the principal outcomes should be the identification of 
terrorism-related leads—that is, any nexus between crime-related and other information 
collected by State, local, tribal, and private entities and a terrorist organization and/or 
attack.  
The fusion process does not replace or replicate mission-specific intelligence and 
information management processes and systems. It does, however, leverage information 
and intelligence developed through these processes and systems to support the rapid 
identification of patterns and trends that may be indicative of an emerging threat 
condition. Although the primary emphasis of intelligence/information fusion is to 
identify, deter, and respond to emerging terrorism-related threats and risks, a collateral 
benefit to State, tribal and local entities is that it will support ongoing efforts to address 
non-terrorism related issues by: 
 
o Allowing State and local entities to better identify and forecast emerging 
crime, public health, and quality-of-life trends;   
o Supporting targeted law enforcement and other multidisciplinary, 
proactive, risk-based and community-focused, problem-solving activities; 
and  
o Improving the delivery of emergency and non-emergency services. 
 
A. RECOMMENDED FUSION CENTER ATTRIBUTES 
 
Fusion is a cyclical process that includes the following stages and activities.  




o Define a management structure (e.g., who is in charge, what entity will 
manage and coordinate daily activities).   
o Identify core (permanent) and ad hoc stakeholders.   
o Design a governance structure advisory committee (multidisciplinary and 
multilevel of government).  
52 
o Define goals and objectives.   
o Develop a process to define information and intelligence collection 
requirements.   
o Develop the process and necessary memorandums of understanding to 
communicate requirements. 
  
2. Planning and Requirements Development 
 
o Conduct (and update frequently) a comprehensive and compatible risk 
assessment (threat, vulnerability, and consequence).   
o Identify patterns and trends reflective of emerging threats.   
o Define collection requirements based on results of risk assessments.   
o Identify the circumstances or events (e.g., crime, public health) that 
represent indicators and/or precursors of threats.   
o Identify the sources and/or repositories of data and information regarding 
indicators and precursors.   
o Identify the existing capacity to collect key information from existing 
sources.   
o Identify collection gaps and mitigate.   
o Define public education, and other activities necessary to enhance 
situational awareness by the public.   
o Develop training for front line law enforcement and other personnel so 
that they can better identify suspicious activities that may represent 
planning and/or operational activity by terrorist group.   
o Ensure a mechanism exists to support reporting of collected information 
(e.g., 9-1-1, tip-line, Internet, connectivity to key information systems).   
o Identify regulatory, statutory, privacy, and/or other issues that impede 
collection and sharing of information.   
o Develop (in partnership with private-sector officials) detailed knowledge 
of vulnerabilities and consequence in the private sector to possible terrorist  
 
53 
attacks to assess the likelihood of attack, the likely methods of attack, the 
likely equipment and substances used to carry out such an attack, and 




o Communicate collection requirements to relevant State, tribal, local, and 
private sector entities.   
o Implement situational awareness activities (e.g., training, public 
education).  
o Mitigate impediments to collection.  
o Compile classified and unclassified data, information and intelligence 
generated by people and organizations.   
o Serve as the 24/7/365 initial point of contact for information provided by 
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Department of Defense, 
Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other Federal 
entities (via telephone calls, Homeland Security Information 
Network/Joint Regional Information Exchange System, LEO, e-mail 
bulletins, VTC, fax) for the receipt of the following: 
• immediate threat-specific information (classified and unclassified)  
• Long-term threat information (classified and unclassified)  
• Tactics and methods used by terrorists (classified and unclassified)  
• Integrate with other reporting systems (e.g., 9-1-1, 3-1-1), and 
establish and maintain further, easy-to-use capability for the public 
reporting of suspicious activity in conjunction with the Joint 
Terrorism Task Force (e.g., internet, toll-free tip-line). 
• Establish a process to identify and track reports of suspicious 
circumstances (e.g., pre-operational surveillance, acquisition of 




o Blend data, information, and intelligence received from multiple sources.  
o Reconcile, de-conflict data, and validate as to credibility of data, 
information and intelligence received from collection sources.   
o Evaluate and analyze data and information using SMEs.   
o Identify and prioritize the risks faced by the jurisdiction (e.g., State, local).   
o Produce value-added intelligence products that can support the 
development of performance-driven, risk-based prevention, response, and 
consequence management programs.   
o Identify specific protective measures to identify and disrupt potential 
terrorist attacks during the planning and early operational stages. 
 
5. Dissemination, Tasking, and Archiving 
 
o Identify those entities and people (e.g., officials, executives) responsible 
for developing and implementing prevention, response, and consequence 
management (public and private) efforts.   
o Provide relevant and actionable intelligence in a timely manner to those 
entities responsible for implementing prevention, response, and 
consequence management efforts (public and private sector). 
o Archive all data, information, and intelligence to support future efforts.   
o Support the development of performance-based prevention, response, and 
consequence management measures.   
o Establish the capacity to track performance metrics associated with 
prevention, response, and consequence management efforts.   




o Track the achievement of prevention, response, and consequence 
management program performance metrics so as to evaluate impact on the 
risk environment.   
o Update threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessments so as to update 
the risk environment.   
o Assess effectiveness of national (i.e., Federal, State, tribal, and local) 
intelligence and information collection requirements process. 
 
7. Modification of Requirements 
 
o Modify collection requirements as necessary.   
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VII. CONCLUSIONS 
Simply put…we have to connect the dots.  On September 10, 2001, we knew the 
following information… 
o Six Arab nationals were taking flying lessons 
o None were doing well 
o Two were disrupting the class 
o Two said no need for take-off & landing training 
o All wanted only Boeing aircraft training 
o One was arrested in August 2001 by INS 
o Three were stopped by CAPPS before boarding 
o and no system to connect the dots 
In December, 2003, the Markle Foundation issued their second report, “Creating a 
Trusted Network for Homeland Security.”76  Their words ring true, even today. 
“Important information or analytical ability resides not just in the 15 intelligence 
components of the federal government and federal law enforcement and security 
agencies, but also… 
– 17,784 state and local law enforcement agencies 
– 30,020 fire departments 
– 5,801 hospitals 
– millions of first responders…on the frontlines of homeland security”77 
I have skimmed the surface of available information regarding the 
intelligence/information sharing dilemma that we face today, not just in the law 
enforcement arena, but throughout the homeland security grid.   
From JRIES/HSIN, to the RISS network, to the failed MATRIX project…there 
are database approaches that have worked to a degree and those that have failed 
miserably.  
                                                 




It is very clear that taking a database approach and making it work is possible.  
The Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning Group is taking steps toward accomplishing 
just that, a fusion process that works.     
It still comes down to people however…people in leadership positions and people 
in black and white police cars.  People at the local Health clinic and people in the 
Emergency room at the local hospital.  The coordination and collaboration of the public 
and private sector entities discussed in this paper are what will make our country safer. 
Interestingly, the responses of the California law enforcement leadership are most 
telling.  The following is a compilation of the four groups, by department size: 
o 77% stated that there was inadequate intelligence sharing between federal, 
state and local agencies   
o 89% said that they had inadequate resources to accomplish that 
intelligence function 
o 90% said that they lacked the proper training 
o 67% were unaware of most federal databases 
o 80% do not receive a daily intelligence briefing 
o Yet, 78% said that they would somehow participate in a local “fusion” 
effort. 
There is hope in those numbers.  One Chief said it most eloquently, “Keep all the 
Suburbans and contamination gear, just give me a good intel analyst, someone who 
knows who to call and what to do with the info when they get it.” 
And what of the leadership role?  Is transformational leadership the model that we 
must utilize to accomplish the law enforcement homeland security role in 2005.  True 
leaders conquer the context, while managers surrender to it.  What better analogy can we 
utilize to describe the state of homeland security and law enforcement today?  The ability 
to adapt to unpredictable and chaotic change is the true mark of leadership in the law 
enforcement arena.  As my survey indicates, the will is there, we just have to find the 
right way.  There are many reasons to believe that transformational leadership just may 
be that way. 
To some degree, the fusion process involves every level and sector (discipline) of 
government, the private-sector, and the public. The level of involvement from these 
59 
participants will vary based on specific circumstances. Some disciplines, such as law 
enforcement, represent a core component of the fusion process because of the 
relationship between crime and information sharing.  In many cases, law enforcement 
authorities are best-suited to coordinate statewide and local fusion efforts. Minimally, the 
fusion process should be organized and coordinated on a regional level and each region 
should establish and maintain an analytic center to facilitate the process. 
Each major urban area (as defined by the Urban Area Security Initiative [UASI] 
program) should establish a similar capacity ensuring it is interlinked with the fusion 
process established by the outlying regions. Other localities, tribal governments, and even 
private-sector entities should develop a process to interlink and participate in these 
regional (or UASI) fusion efforts. The public should be engaged through public education 
programs that describe what they should look for and what to do if they observe 
suspicious activities or circumstances. 
Efforts should be organized and managed on a geographic basis and scalable so 
adjustments can be made based on changes in the operating and/or threat environment. 
While national standards and guidelines should guide the institutionalization of the 
process, the actual technological infrastructure and operational protocols used by 
individual jurisdictions should be based on the management structure, specific needs, and 
capabilities of each individual jurisdiction.  One size does not fit all, but there are 
examples available that demonstrate successful approaches.  We can no longer afford 
failure. 
We invariably return to the essential question…How can we improve information 
and intelligence sharing at the local law enforcement level?  While the word “improve” 
implies that there is an existing system or method, I am not sure that we are even able to 
make that statement in 2005.  What I have suggested in this thesis are possibilities.  There 
is, perhaps, a way to accomplish the necessary and vital process for the real-time and 
consistent information flow between federal, state and local entities.   
While the lack of information and intelligence sharing has been excruciatingly 
dissected since September 11, 2001, we have made halting steps toward a functional 
system.  I began my discussion with three options.  While the Super-Agency approach 
has worked in other countries and had been intricately studied in this one, I believe the 
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end result may be a refinement of the FBI domestic intelligence function, rather than the 
creation of an American version of MI-5.  The role of law enforcement in foreign policy 
cannot be understated and except for the enormous reach of the New York City Police 
Department, no municipal law enforcement agency has the resources to play but a 
supporting role.   
The Legal Reform approach offers programmatic rather than structural changes.  
The Patriot Act I and II, with the accompanying civil liberties controversy, provided 
numerous tools for accomplishing the homeland security mission, but as stated by Deputy 
Commissioner Cohen, “The Patriot Act helps the FBI do its job.  And that is good for us.  
I’m too busy to see if the FBI abuses its power.”78 The point being that the legal reforms 
that I discussed previously deal mainly with the federal approach rather than a direct 
effect on state or local agencies. 
The Database approach holds the key, since it can be adaptable nationwide.  
Within the Department of Homeland Security, sharing information so that different 
federal, state and local agencies all have access to the same data, when appropriate, is not 
just a good idea – it is the law.  More precisely, it is the basis for a series of presidential 
directives and part of the overall strategy at DHS.   
“It has been the highest priority, or among the highest priorities, since the 
formation of the Department.”79 
According to Holcomb, there has been enormous technical progress and some 
significant success in DHS information sharing.  An example is the sharing of terrorist 
watch lists.  Partnering between federal departments has led to a unified screening 
database, creating a definitive source within DHS that is readily available to those that 
need it.  Holcomb also believes that advances in hardware and software have removed 
many of the technological barriers to information sharing.80 
On the flip side, retired Lieutenant John Aerts of the Los Angeles County 
Sheriff’s Department, offers a slightly different view.  Aerts was involved with the 
Department of Justice task force on the global Justice XML data model standard 
                                                 
78 David Cohen (Deputy Commissioner, NYPD), CNN Interview April 2005. 
79 Lee Holcomb (Chief Technology Officer, Department of Homeland Security), Interview with 
author, May 2005. 
80 Ibid. 
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(GJXDM).  “There is no technology issue.  Using the global justice model and the tool 
sets for sharing data and analyzing data, any of this can be accomplished anywhere.  The 
issue always comes down to politics and turf.” 81 
These contrasting views provide a perfect summary of the state of information 
sharing today.  We may have the technical ability to share vast amounts of information 
today, but we do not yet have the political or jurisdictional means to get it done. 
What we do have are existing networks, each well-known in narcotics 
enforcement circles, that may provide the framework for advancement.  RISSnet, RISS 
ATIX, JRIES/HSIN all have enormous potential and existing frameworks.  As is often 
the case in law enforcement, however, the overall knowledge of these systems is lacking 
(as evidenced by the Chiefs and Sheriffs responses to the questions regarding existing 
databases) and the political will is not yet there. 
Where there is political will and leadership, there exists a model framework that 
has promise.  The Los Angeles TEW model provides one example that holds promise for 
success.  While the metrics that measures that success are still nebulous (the 
measurement of prevention efforts will always be difficult), the transformational 
leadership and teamwork demonstrated by the LA TEW can be emulated using similar 
models. 
Thus, the more generic outline of fusion center attributes and stages that can serve 
as a guide for any information sharing effort, whether it be large or small, urban or rural.   
If we can overcome the problems of funding, politics, jurisdictions and 
technology and have universal data analysis, relevant information sharing and effective 
transformational leadership, we will have taken a major step toward the ultimate goal – a 








                                                 























                                      






























VENTURA POLICE DEPARTMENT 























California State Warning System – Terrorism Information 
 
64 
As the result of a Presidential Directive to improve communication between Local 
and Federal law enforcement, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the California State 
Office of Homeland Security, and the California Highway Patrol have created a program 
to provide local law enforcement officers direct and timely access to FBI and other 
Federal databases that relate to terrorism.  This service can be accessed through the 
California State Warning Center and will be available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. 
 
Local law enforcement officers in the field will receive real time information 
relative to potential terrorism related subjects and any other information that could be 
beneficial to an ongoing investigation.  The program is designed to assist local law 
enforcement officers who are making traffic stops or conducting investigations of 
suspicious addresses or subjects.  The program is designed to identify whether the 
individual(s) or circumstances may be related to terrorist activities.  
 
Local law enforcement dispatch centers call the center, provide the data, and 
should receive information on what action the officer in the field should take. This could 
vary from taking no action, completing an FI and release, or detaining the individual for 
an FBI agent to interview the subject.  The return should be within 20 minutes depending 
on the nature of the information. 
 
Procedure for accessing this information:  
• Telephone the California State Warning Center:  
• The requestor must provide verification of law enforcement status, their 
Originating Agency Identifier (the Ventura Police ORI is CA0XXXXX), and an 
agency call back number. 
• Depending on the circumstances, the request will be classified as requiring either 
an immediate or routine response from the FBI Counter Terrorism Watch. 
• The Counter Terrorism Watch will query various Federal databases and the 
CATIC databases in an effort to determine if the subject, phone number, or 
address is of interest. 
• The Counter Terrorism Watch will provide guidance as to what course of action is 
to be taken as it relates to the queried subject.  The return call should occur in 
approximately 20 minutes.  
 
Additionally, all developed information will be forwarded to the local FBI Joint 
Terrorism Task Force for further action regardless of the initial directives provided to the 
officers in the field at the time. 
 
Ventura Police Officers who access and utilize this will complete the VPD 
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